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Abstract
We examine two factors that help explain the prevalence of con￿ ict
in low-income countries: that adversaries cannot enforce long-term
contracts in arms, and that open con￿ ict alters the future strategic
positions of the adversaries di⁄erently than does peace. Using an
in￿nite horizon model, we show the conditions under which adver-
saries will not be able to sustain short-term contracts even though
doing so is Pareto superior to open con￿ ict. Con￿ ict arises because
adversaries attempt to gain future strategic supremacy that only
victory in con￿ ict brings. Lower incomes or wages, as well as higher
discount factors and the less destructive con￿ ict is, the higher is the
likelihood of war.
1 Introduction
During the post-WW II period civil wars have taken place in at least 73 countries
with millions of casualties and economic costs that have greatly contributed to
their slow, or negative, growth.1 From a traditional economic perspective it is
di¢ cult to understand such a record of apparent ine¢ ciency. For setting aside
1An overview of the costs and other problems associated with con￿ict can be found in the
World Bank report of Collier et. al. (2003). The number of countries mentioned is quoted
from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Hess (2003) provides estimates of the indirect costs of con￿ict
in terms of reduced trading and welfare that are about 8% of GDP on average for low-income
countries, but of course are much higher for some countries and non-existent for other. For
an overview of the recent academic literature on civil wars, see Sambanis (2004).
1the cost of arming, the question is why don￿ t the di⁄erent parties just settle their
di⁄erences peacefully under the threat of con￿ ict? Given that war is destructive,
breaks the various complementarities in production and trade, and has a number
of other external and indirect e⁄ects both in space and time (see Collier et. al.,
2003), a peaceful settlement in the shadow of con￿ ict would appear perfectly
feasible. Such a peace would by no means necessitate disarmament. The Cold
War or a traditional balance of power that periodically takes place for decades
at a time could conceivably take place within countries between contending
ethnic, class, or religious groups. Of course, such settlements do occur but our
question, posed from an economic perspective, is why don￿ t they always take
place?
One possible explanation involves various forms of asymmetric information.
The contending parties within a country might not know one another￿ s strengths
and weaknesses, preferences, capabilities, or any other attributes of the envi-
ronment within which they are operating. It has been known for some time
in economics that asymmetric information in any one dimension can by itself
prevent the parties from attaining mutually bene￿cial trades. Models speci￿-
cally addressing the possibility of con￿ ict in the presence of mutually bene￿cial
settlement when there is asymmetric information include Brito and Intriligator
(1985) and Bester and Warneryd (1998). Especially when secrecy is important,
as it is true in the case of coups for example, asymmetric information appears
central to understanding why peaceful settlements might not occur (although
asymmetric information is not necessary for coups, see McBride (2004)2). How-
ever, many civil wars and low-level con￿ icts last for many years, even decades.
The contending parties involved in such con￿ icts must have learned after a
2McBride (2004) describes how coups can arise due to incomplete contracting. When
incumbent politicians cannot commit to e¢ cient policies, they will resort to clientelist practices
to gain popular support. If the incumbents are successful, political opponents￿only way to
gain political power is by attempting a coup.
2reasonable time period the principal aspects of one another￿ s capabilities and
preferences and, therefore, continuing con￿ ict would be di¢ cult to explain by
means of asymmetric information. That is, the inability of the FARC and the
various Colombian governments over the years or of the government of Angola
and UNITA over that country￿ s long civil war not to settle could hardly be
considered an outcome of informational asymmetries.
In this paper we argue for a possible explanation of con￿ ict that we think
is empirically important but which has received much less attention than it
deserves. There are two components in the explanation we discuss:
(i) Adversaries are unable to enforce long-term contracts on arming, although
short-term contracts, conditional on arming and under the threat of con￿ ict, can
be written.
(ii) Open con￿ ict changes the future strategic positions of the adversaries in
di⁄erent ways than does a peaceful contract under the threat of con￿ ict.
The ￿rst component has become familiar to economists over the past two
decades, especially for dynamic settings.3 If there are di¢ culties in writing or
enforcing long-term contracts on items like the job-speci￿c training an employee
in a high-income country with a modern government and functioning institu-
tions, it should not be surprising that enforcing long-term disarmament in a
country with weak governance and institutions would be di¢ cult. For arming is
not just any item like job-speci￿c training; in the presence of weak institutions it
is the ultimate source that contending parties have at their disposal for enforcing
other contracts. If contracts on arms cannot be written or enforced, arming can
be expected to take place. Warfare, however, can be avoided since short-term
contracts on everything else can be enforced given the arms possessed by each
party. That is, condition (i) by itself is not su¢ cient to generate open con￿ ict.
3Grossman and Hart (1986) introduced the main idea for the theory of the ￿rm, whereby
parties cannot write long-term contracts on relationship-speci￿c investments. Skaperdas
(2003) discusses how incomplete contracting relates to civil wars.
3What is also needed is a time dependence that is described in condition
(ii). Open con￿ ict results in winners and losers not just in terms of today￿ s
rewards but also by changing the strategic positions of the adversaries well into
the future; typically, the winners have a higher chance of success and losers a
lower one if they were to encounter each other in further future confrontations.
A peaceful short-term contract, by contrast, does not dramatically change the
future relative positions of the adversaries as open con￿ ict does. There might
be secular trends that favor one party over another but such a trend would
be di⁄erent from the change in strategic positions that comes about through
open con￿ ict. As long as open con￿ ict and short-term settlements have di⁄erent
implications for the parties￿future strategic positions, one or more parties might
decide to forgo the short-term advantages of peace for the uncertain but higher
expected future bene￿ts that can come from open con￿ ict.
A discussion of the ideas that we explore in this paper was in Fearon (1995).
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) showed how making the ￿ shadow of the fu-
ture￿longer increases arming but did not distinguish between open con￿ ict and
settlement under the threat of con￿ ict. Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas (2000) devel-
oped a ￿nite-horizon model that actually demonstrates how open con￿ ict occurs.
Related in spirit is Acemoglu and Robinson￿ s (2000) ￿nding that there might
not exist short-term transfers that could prevent a revolt. Powell (2004) also
discusses the main issues and presents an illustrative model. Bester and Konrad
(2004, 2005) examine the decisions of rivals on whether to attack or not to cap-
ture terrirory over ￿nite or in￿nite horizons and show how large asymmetries
in power or expectations of future equality can induce warfare. Mehlum and
Moene (2005), although they do not distinguish between open con￿ ict and set-
tlement under the threat of con￿ ict, concentrate on the role of the incumbency
advantage that control of the state confers and how it stimulates arming.
In this paper we examine an in￿nite horizon model that shows how open
4con￿ ict occurs within the context of low-income countries. Open con￿ ict leads
to destruction and therefore there is a short-run incentive to settle and peacefully
divide the disputed output. War, though, eliminates one of the adversaries or
increases the chance on winning a future war for the winner and increases the
chance of future losses for the loser. Thus, the possible current losses due to war
are weighed against the possible future bene￿ts of weakening or eliminating one￿ s
opponent. In our model, the bene￿ts to the winner come from the reduction or
elimination of future arming but there are of course many other bene￿ts that
exist and that we brie￿ y discuss.
The explanation for war that we advance is not meant to apply to the post-
WWII period only. Organized warfare has been central to the experience of
humanity since the agricultural revolution. And, in particular, the place in
which modern governance evolved ￿Western Europe ￿has had more than its
share of civil and inter-state warfare. For example, most late Medieval Italian
cities were wracked by clan warfare for centuries before they developed ways
of limiting their arming through checks and balances, representative politics,
or through autocracy. But what followed was warfare at a higher level in the
whole Italian peninsula, between city-states, ecclesiastical states, and absolutist
monarchs (that was the world that Machiavelli lived in; see McNeill (1982, Ch.3)
or Tilly (1992, Chs 2 and 3) for overviews). It was only in the second half of the
nineteenth century that Italy was uni￿ed. It would be hard to argue that all
this warfare has been caused by asymmetric information, or to some systematic
misperceptions and miscalculations. The combination of incomplete contracting
and the fundamental non-stationarity or time-dependence of the future should
be seriously considered as an explanation of open warfare that is complementary
to existing ones.
52 The Basic Setting: War versus Armed Peace
Consider two groups, A and B , that compete for power and interact over an
inde￿nite horizon. They compete for output of value Y . Because the two groups
cannot write contracts on the ultimate source of enforcement, arms, they have
to expend resources rA and rB to maintain their position. These expenditures
are necessary regardless of whether War or "Armed Peace" ultimately prevails.4
In the event of War, arms a⁄ect the probabilities of winning for each side; we
denote these probabilities by pA and pB. (How these probabilities depend on
arms is examined in the next section.) In the case of Peace, rA and rB ￿through
their e⁄ect on the probabilities of winning in the event of War ￿in￿ uence each
group￿ s bargaining position in arriving at a particular settlement.
If War were to take place only a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of Y can be consumed
with the rest, (1 ￿ ￿)Y , being destroyed by the con￿ ict. In each period, then,
the expected single-period payo⁄ of group i = A;B in the event of War is:
Uw
i = pi￿Y ￿ ri (1)
Given that war is destructive, in each period both sides would prefer to
divide Y in shares that equal their winning probabilities since it would result in
a payo⁄ of piY ￿ ri > pi￿Y ￿ ri = Uw
i : A range of other possible divisions of
Y would also be Pareto superior to the payo⁄s under War. Under an inde￿nite
repetition of such single-period simple interactions, there would never be an
incentive to go to War, provided the two groups could costlessly communicate
and output Y is divisible.
However, if War were to occur, we would reasonably expect interactions
between the two groups to be di⁄erent in the future, perhaps fundamentally so.
Given that the winner of the war would receive ￿Y and the loser nothing, the
4The term "armed peace" is due to Jack Hirshleifer.
6resources that the winning side could command in the future can be expected
to be higher than those of the winner which in turn could bias future wars
even further in favor of today￿ s winner. The winner could also gain possession
of the state, something which could provide them both with greater resources
that would not be obtainable otherwise and with greater ability to withstand
challenges from the other group in the future. Such induced asymmetries could
well make war an attractive possibility by trading o⁄ a lower expected payo⁄
for today for more of it in the future.
For now we allow a stark and simple form of dependence of future power on
today￿ s war. We suppose that the loser of a war in any period would be unable
to raise the resources that are necessary to challenge the winner in future periods
and, thus, the winner would be able to enjoy the output Y in all future periods
whereas the loser receives nothing. (In Section 4 we illustrate how our ￿ndings
extend to the less stark setting in which for a group to drop completely out of
contention there is a series of battles, and not just one, that it would have to
lose.)
Consider, then, the negotiations that would result in either Peace or War
in any particular period in which no War has occurred in the past and each
group has already invested its resources in guns (i.e., ri is a sunk investment).
Further, and without loss of generality, suppose group A is the one that has the
initiative in making a proposal (by for example holding the reins of a perhaps
weak government). In case of Peace, the group would receive the whole value
of Y and would make an o⁄er of subsidy S to group B; which would either
accept or reject A￿ s o⁄er. If the o⁄er were to be rejected, War would ensue.
The resources that either party has invested in arms is considered sunk so that
they play no more in current negotiations.
Assuming a discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1); the discounted expected payo⁄ for
group i in the event of War is the following:
7V W
i = pi￿Y + pi￿1
t=1￿
tY + (1 ￿ pi)￿1
t=1￿




Note how in the event of War, since one group would be eliminated from
contention, in the future no resources would be devoted to arming. Group B
would accept any o⁄er S from group A that satis￿es the following inequality:
S + ￿VB(S) ￿ V W
B (3)
where VB(S) denotes the continuation payo⁄of group B when it is out of power
given the subsidy S: As part of any Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which a
positive subsidy is given, group A would o⁄er a subsidy S￿ that satis￿es (3) as
an equality. Assuming that S￿ would be accepted in this period, it would be
acceptable in all future periods and therefore VB(S￿) = S
￿￿rB
1￿￿ : Then, from (3)
and (2), the subsidy would be:
S￿ = pB[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]Y + ￿rB (4)
Note that this subsidy that must be o⁄ered by group A to group B in order
to prevent War depends positively on the power of group B (as proxied by
its probability of winning pB), on the share of output that is not destroyed in
the event of War, on the discount factor, as well as on the value of output Y:
However, this minimally acceptable subsidy to group B might not be in group
A￿ s interest to o⁄er. In particular, the resultant payo⁄ of group A should be
preferable to its expected payo⁄ under War, or
Y ￿ S￿ + ￿VA(S￿) ￿ V W
A (5)
where VA(S￿) = Y ￿S
￿￿rA
1￿￿ is the continuation payo⁄ of group A if peace were
to prevail forever. Supposing the probabilities of winning for the two sides sum
8to one (i.e. pA + pB = 1), it is straightforward to show that the condition for
Armed Peace (so that (3) and (5) are both satis￿ed) is as follows:
Y ￿
￿ (rA + rB)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(6)
When this inequality is reversed, there would not be a subsidy that is feasible,
and War would ensue. Thus, based on (6), War is more likely and Armed Peace
is less likely,
(i) the lower is the contested output Y ;
(ii) the higher are the resources devoted to arming (rA + rB) by the two
groups;
(iii) the higher is the discount factor ￿; and
(iv) the less destructive War is (or, the higher is ￿).
When contested output is low, as it presumably is in low-income countries,
the current cost of going to War (controlling for ￿) is low (as that cost equals
Y (1 ￿ ￿)), and therefore going to War becomes easier.
On the one hand, greater arming increases the likelihood of War because
War tilts the balance of power in favor of one side and reduces (and in our case,
completely eliminates) the future costs of arming; Armed Peace, on the other
hand, as its name suggests necessitates incurring the cost of arming forever.
Given the long conditioning of folk-theorem arguments, the e⁄ect of the
discount factor on War appears to be counterintuitive. Note that folk-theorem
arguments merely describe the possibility of cooperation by means of supergame
strategies, typically in stationary settings. Nothing guarantees cooperation in
such settings because the accompanying strategies and equilibria are rather
fragile and non-renegotiation proof. By contrast, we concentrate on regular
strategies and equilibrium in a time-dependent setting. The more the future is
valued, as indicated by a higher value of the discount factor ￿, the greater the
9salience of the expected future rewards is compared to the current costs of War
and therefore the higher is the likelihood of War.
Thus far the resources devoted to arms (rA and rB) have been considered ex-
ogenous parameters. That might well be the case in many low-income countries
if the groups involved face liquidity constraints and organizational disadvan-
tages that prevent them from increasing their arming to levels that would be
consistent with an unconstrained equilibrium. Arms embargoes and di¢ culties
in accessing the international arms market could also play a role in restraining
arming to levels that can be considered as given. We next consider conditions
in which no such constraints exist.
3 Endogenous Arming
To allow for endogenous arming, we ￿rst need to specify how probabilities of
winning depend on arming. We suppose that these probabilities depend on
arming through the following additive contest success function (see Tullock,







where i = A;B and m 2 (0;1] (7)
The parameter m has been described as a measure of the e⁄ectiveness of
decisiveness of con￿ ict. A higher value of this parameter could be associated
with more advanced forms of warfare that might have been traditionally less
prevalent in many low-income countries but is now available there.
Further, suppose that arming is available at constant marginal cost ! > 0:
Given that an integral part of the cost of arming is actually the cost of hiring
soldiers and since the cost of labor is lower in low-income countries, we expect
a lower ! to be associated with lower incomes.
Note that when group A contemplates whether to o⁄er a subsidy to group B
10or go to War, the continuation payo⁄of group B would still be the one described
in (2). Conditional on Armed Peace, the subsidy that would just induce B not









B denote arming under Armed Peace, which in general can be
di⁄erent than arming under War. The payo⁄ functions of the two groups under



















fpB(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)Y ￿ ￿!rP
B ￿ !rP
Bg (10)
If there were to be Armed Peace, equilibrium arming would be:
rP￿
A = rP￿
B = rP￿ =
m
2!
(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))Y (11)
The e⁄ects of di⁄erent variables on equilibrium arming under Armed Peace
are intuitively plausible, but it is worth noting how the negative e⁄ect on arming
of lower output (and income) Y is counteracted by the positive e⁄ect of a lower
wage income !:
For Armed Peace to be an equilibrium, however, both inequalities (3) and
(5) would still need to be satis￿ed. Substituting the equilibrium arms in (11)
in (9) and (10), and comparing these to the continuation payo⁄s under War we




￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) (12)
11Before discussing this condition, we analyze the equilibrium if War were to
























That is, arming under War is much more intense than if Armed Peace were
to prevail and it exactly equals the discounted sum of all future arming if Armed
Peace were to prevail. That appears plausible, as War involved ￿ghting for all
future streams of output whereas Armed Peace involves the division of current
output only. Because War involves such high expenditures on arming we might
expect the adversaries to face serious liquidity constraints so that War might
be averted in some cases. However, as Collier et. al. (2003, p. 77) have found,
recently rebel groups raise funds by selling the advance rights to the extraction
of minerals that they currently do not control, and thus are able to at least
partly circumvent the severe liquidity constraints that War entails.
Going back to the condition (12) for War and Peace, we can conclude that
War is more likely and Armed Peace less likely when
(i) wage income and the cost of arming as indicated by ! are low;
(ii) the e⁄ectiveness of con￿ ict as represented by m is high;
(iii) the higher is the discount factor ￿; and
(iv) the less destructive War is (or, the higher is ￿).
Items (iii) and (iv) are identical to those in the previous section where arming
is exogenous. By endogenizing arming, not only have we eliminated arms from
the condition, we have also eliminated contested output Y as well. Instead,
12we have two additional features that increase the likelihood of War: the higher
e⁄ectiveness of modern con￿ ict that can be more easily imported nowadays and
the lower cost of arming that comes from lower wages.
4 Multiple Victories for Winning the War
Our analysis thus far assumes that one War determines the victor, yet com-
pletely eliminating one￿ s opponent is often only achieved after a series of smaller
victories. We here extend the basic model from Section 2 into a repeated game
in which more than one War, more appropriately called a battle in this context,
must be won in order to achieve total victory.
In any given period t, A and B will again make the same War-or-Armed
Peace decision as before, yet now their interaction will depend on the existing
state of relative power which can di⁄er over time. To keep the analysis as simple
as possible, we will suppose there are ￿ve states, x = 0;1;:::;4. Moreover, let x
denote the relative strength of A and B, so that if they are in state x at time t,
then A wins the next armed con￿ ict with probability pA = x
4. Should con￿ ict
occur in this state and A wins, then the setting moves to state x+1 in time t+1,
while if B wins, then the setting moves to state x￿1 in time t+1. A achieves
total victory by winning enough battles to reach state 4, since pA = 4
4 = 1 in
that state. Conversely, B achieves total victory by reaching state 0.
Further suppose that the last winner of an open con￿ ict has temporary
control over the resources not destroyed by the ￿ghting, and is the player in
position to make a settlement o⁄er. Speci￿cally, let A be the proposer in state
3, let B be the proposer in state 1, and let either A or B be the proposer in state
2 depending on who won the prior War. The idea here is that if we start in the
even strength state 2, then states 1 and 3 are only ever reached by a victory by
B or A, respectively, in the prior period.
13Notice how winning a War brings the victor closer to Total Victory in two
ways. First, winning today brings the state closer to the Total Victory state,
and second, winning today increases the chances of winning the future Wars
that are needed to achieve that Total Victory. Also note that the basic setting
presented earlier in Section 2 would be a three state, x = 0;1;2, version of this
model in which pA = x
2.
This type of competition has been termed a ￿tug-of-war￿ by earlier re-
searchers because of the potential for each side to move from a position of
strength to weakness, and because the contest occurs over many periods. For
example, Harris and Vickers (1987) use a multi-state race with contest success
functions to study an R&D race in which each organization achieves victory
only after separating itself from its rival, and Budd, Harris, and Vickers (1993)
examine duopoly ￿rms in a similar race achieve market dominance. That said,
the nature of the tug-of-war in our model di⁄ers in one key respect. In addition
to one side￿ s victory today bringing them closer to total victory, victory today
also confers an additional advantage by increasing the victor￿ s relative strength
today. That is, the victory today increases the likelihood that the same group
will be the victor again the next period. This changing of relative power acts
to increase the bene￿ts of victory today while also increasing the cost of losing
today. Our work also di⁄ers in that we apply the tug-of-war model to a new
setting of War and Armed Peace.
To examine which is optimal, War versus Armed Peace, for each group re-
quires multiple steps in the logic. First, we must ￿nd the value functions for the
situation in which War always occurs in each of the contention states x = 1;2;3.
Next, we calculate what settlements must be o⁄ered to avert War and sustain
Armed Peace in each period. This procedure, which is detailed in the appendix,
yields the following four conditions for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium:5
5See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) for a discussion of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium


















￿ In state 2, if A is the proposer, an accepted subsidy will be made only if
Y ￿ 3￿
22(1 + ￿)rA + (1 + ￿)rB




￿ In state 2, if B is the proposer, an accepted subsidy will be made only if
Y ￿ 3￿
22(1 + ￿)rB + (1 + ￿)rA






















Equations (15)-(18) are directly related to condition (6) for Armed Peace
in the basic setting examined in Section 2. Again, War is more likely in any
period and any state when:
(i) the lower is the contested output Y ;
(ii) the higher are the resources devoted to arming (rA + rB) by the two
groups;
(iii) the higher is the discount factor ￿; and
(iv) the less destructive War is (or, the higher is ￿).
Notice that the conditions for War in multi-stage con￿ ict are qualitatively
identical to those found using the basic model in Section 2. Thus, the basic
model captures the primary strategic elements at work in the choice between
War and Armed Peace.
However, the conditions are not identical quantitatively, and we can ask
whether Armed Peace is more likely when total victory requires more War vic-
tories. To ￿nd out, we check whether equation (6) is less likely to be met
concept.
15than equations (15)-(18). To simplify this comparison, further suppose that
rA = rB = r. The symmetry implied by this assumption means that we need
only compare (6) with (15) and (16), since (17) and (18) will now be identical
to (15) and (16), respectively.
With this additional symmetry, (6) becomes
Y ￿
2￿r
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
; (19)
and (15) and (16), respectively, become
Y ￿
3￿ (￿ + 1)r
￿







2 (1 + ￿)r




A little bit more algebra reveals that (20) and (21) are both less than (19)
(since ￿ and ￿ are both less than 1) . Thus, requiring more victories does
increase the likelihood of Armed Peace. Requiring more victories lengthens the
time it may take to achieve total victory, thereby increasing the cost of defeating
one￿ s opponent.
Although Armed Peace is more likely in this setting, it is not guaranteed.
In technical terms, Armed Peace never becomes the only equilibrium for all
parameter settings. This is true even if the model were extended to a larger
number of states, whereby a larger number of Wars must be won for total victory
to be achieved. The reason is that there is always an incentive to achieve total
victory since it is the only way to avoid costly arming. As long as this total
victory incentive exists, there is an incentive to ￿ght, and the question is whether
or not the bene￿ts to Armed Peace outweigh those of ￿ghting. As our analysis
shows, many conditions present in low income countries are those that make
Armed Peace less likely even if total victory requires winning a series of battles.
165 Concluding Remarks
Why does con￿ ict occur, and disproportionately so in low-income countries?
Our analysis examines two key factors, that adversaries cannot make long-term
contracts to enforce disarmament, and that open con￿ ict changes the strategic
nature of future interaction. Our analysis also considers two key features of low-
income countries, that adversaries can make short-run (as distinguished from
long-term) contracts, and that achieving total victory prevents one from having
to spend resources towards arming. Even though total victory, once achieved,
is in some sense e¢ cient because it no longer requires costly arms buildup, the
only way to achieve it is through open con￿ ict, which is ine¢ cient because,
not only does it require the costly buildup of arms, but it also leads to the
destruction of resources. Armed Peace is thus a possible middle ground.
However, our analysis shows that Armed Peace is not inevitable because the
incentives to ￿ght are strong. Our basic model shows that con￿ ict is more
likely than Armed Peace in low-income countries with low contested output,
large resources devoted to arming, high discount factors, and less destructive
war. When opponents choose their arming levels, we ￿nd that con￿ ict is more
likely with low wages and low arming costs. Prolonging the length of time
necessary to achieve total victory may increase the chances of Armed Peace,
although the same conditions as those above will still lead to con￿ ict. The lure
of total victory and its impact on future strategic positioning remains a strong
incentive to engage in open con￿ ict.
In short, the combination of incomplete contracting and the possibility of
total victory leads to con￿ ict. If parties can make long-term contracts, then
the destructive nature of War leads to settlement that makes each side better
o⁄ than ￿ghting. Moreover, even if parties are unable to make long-term
contracts, there still might exist the possibility of short-term contracts that can
17be enforced by each side￿ s threat to ￿ght. However, even these short-term
contracts might not be enough to enable Armed Peace. If con￿ ict today alters
the future positions of the adversaries, then one or more parties might forgo
the short-term relative safety of Armed Peace and opt for the chance of total
victory and its associated high bene￿ts by open con￿ ict.
We conclude that the shadow of the future looms large in low-income coun-
tries that exhibit the many factors conducive to War described herein. Achiev-
ing a lasting peace will require the development of institutions necessary to
enforce it, that is, the institutions necessary to foster peaceful resolutions to
competition over scarce resource. Since these institutions are costly to im-
plement (Gradstein, 2004) and take time to develop (Genicot and Skaperdas,
2002),6 our ￿ndings suggest that low-income countries can remain in a vicious
cycle of poverty and violent civil or political violence for prolonged periods.
6 Appendix
Let V t
i (x) denote i￿ s present discounted value of being in state x. The value
functions for the total victory states are thus V t
A (0) = 0, V t




1￿￿, and V t
B (4) = 0. Note that in the total victory states there is no need to
arm by expending rA or rB since the opponent has been eliminated.
To examine which is optimal for the groups, War versus Armed Peace, in
the other states requires two steps in the logic. We ￿rst ￿nd the value functions
for the situation in which War always occurs in each of the contention states
x = 1;2;3. Next, we calculate what settlements must be o⁄ered to avert
War and sustain Armed Peace in each period. In this manner, we obtain the
conditions for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
6Of course, external shocks may help a country get started on a good path. McBride
(forthcoming), for example, shows how economic crises in low income countries may actually
lead to economic reforms and a decline in con￿ict.
18Value functions under War in each period. War in a contested state


































































































B (2) ￿ ￿rB
￿
: (27)
To ￿nd the present discounted values for group A if War occurs in every
contested period, plug (22) and (24) into (23) to solve for V W
A (2), and then









































24￿ ￿ 20￿￿ ￿ 6￿
2￿ + 2￿





















24￿ ￿ 20￿￿ ￿ 6￿
2￿ + 2￿






















































We will use these equations in a moment when we determine when Armed
19Peace or open con￿ ict will result from optimizing behavior.
When Armed Peace is optimal. Let Si (x) be the o⁄er made by i in
state x. Note that if i￿ s o⁄er is accepted by j in state x in period t, then that
same o⁄er would be accepted in period t+1 because they would still be in state
x. Thus, to determine what Si (x) would be accepted by j, we compare the
in￿nite stream of Si (x)￿ s that j would get with what j would get going to War




(SA (3) ￿ rB) ￿
￿
8￿ ￿ 2￿














where the RHS is equation (26). Since A will make the smallest such o⁄er that










































































We must now ask when making one of these o⁄ers is optimal for the proposer.
A will o⁄er S￿







A (3) ￿ rA)
￿
￿
24￿ ￿ 20￿￿ ￿ 6￿
2￿ + 2￿



































20which is exactly equation (15).
Doing the same comparison for an o⁄er by A in state 2 yields condition
Y ￿ 3￿
22(1 + ￿)rA + (1 + ￿)rB




which is equation (16).
Finally, repeating the process for B in states 2 and 1 yields
Y ￿ 3￿
22(1 + ￿)rB + (1 + ￿)rA

















4 ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿
2￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
respectively, which are equations (17) and (18).
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